Introduction
Writing in 2000, Michael Freeman argued that, whilst much had been achieved for children in the 20th century, it had not been the century of the child (2000: 553-554) . He expressed the hope that the next century would turn out otherwise (ibid: 555). In this chapter, I explore the extent to which we are now able to realise this ambition in relation to decision-making afffecting children. The need for some measure of state regulation of decision-making about children is beyond doubt. Not all children can make signifĳicant decisions for themselves, and we cannot assume that families will always be intact or agree sufffĳiciently to make such decisions for children. This is the case even if we assume that 'families' generally make decisions in their children's 'best interests'.1 The issue then arises as to the shape of this regulation. The legal decision-making framework employed is critical because it determines both the scope of decisions that can be made without state scrutiny or supervision and the weight that can be placed on particular factors they can take into account, such as religious or cultural concerns. In order to make this a century of the child, I suggest that we need to reach a common understanding of the reasons why it is important to regard children as a 'special case',2 whether this is implemented by thinking of children as rights-holders,3 by prioritising children through a 'best interests' or welfare perspective, or by focusing on the duties adults owe to children. These three types of approach should be taken together for this purpose because, I argue, they are simply tools -language descriptors, ways of framing individual considerations, processes and frameworks -for working with the same substantive content. Once we have agreed upon the reasons why it is important to treat children as a special case, we need to assess which of these three ways of interacting with the substantive content of decisions afffecting children makes achieving these aims most likely. It is the substantive outcome for afffected children that holds critical importance. Which approach we prefer or emphasise (where multiple approaches co-exist in any particular context) should thus depend on how well it guides decision-makers towards or makes more likely better outcomes for afffected children.
After briefly outlining why current conceptions of children's rights cannot meet this test, I explain why a welfare or 'best interests' approach4 is no better suited towards achieving this end.5 The remainder of the chapter explores the potential for a duty-based approach. I argue that duty can have three roles: as a tool to give specifĳic-ity and resolve conflicts in current rights-and welfare-based decision-making; as a theoretical framework, focused on the decision-maker; and as part of the justifĳication for adopting a virtue-inspired understanding of the aim for legal decision-making affecting children -to enable children to flourish on their own terms. I conclude by exploring the practical implications of a duty-based argument and discuss three key examples, namely the Court of Appeal's decision in Re A (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] Only where I use 'welfare' or 'welfare-based approach' to reference the framework for decision-making is it interchangeable with the 'welfare principle'; otherwise, it may also refer to individual competing considerations operating within a diffferent framework. 5
This includes the rejection of a relational welfare approach, such as that argued for by Herring (2005) and Herring and Foster (2012) .
